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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In recent years, particularly since high profile attacks such as 9/11 and the London bombings, ever-
increasing attention has been paid to organisations that use violence in furtherance of their goals. 
When one thinks of the perpetrators of such violence, the stereotypical image that comes to mind 
is that of a young Arab or Middle Eastern male figure, be they disenchanted by the political or 
economic policies of their country, easily swayed due to poverty or unemployment, sick of 
intervention or occupation by outside forces, or radicalised by extremist religious preaching, to 
name but a few reasons. One figure that does not enter our minds is that of a woman. This is a 
widespread phenomenon, whereby the image of a violent political actor has been engrained in our 
minds by societal expectations, gender norms and the media to be of a certain sex, male to be 
precise. 
When examining such instances of political violence, we can observe that, in general, women have 
traditionally been relegated to ‘auxiliary and subservient roles’ (Yesevi, 2014: 583). An exception 
to this finding are left-wing revolutionary and nationalist groups which tend to be more liberal and 
which have enabled women to mobilise in strong leadership positions that acknowledge and 
appreciate their agency and ability as powerful central players in those organisations (Weinberg 
and Eubank, 2011). This was especially evident in secular groups such as Baader Meinhof, the Red 
Brigades and the Shining Path, which included the liberation of women in their goals (Bloom, 
2007a). In patriarchal Islamic groups however, women are usually limited to peripheral positions 
such as facilitators, educators and supporters. They are traditionally not seen on the front lines of 
action, be that in leadership positions or in positions where they are seen to have responsibility for, 
or carry out, missions that are central to the goals of the organisation. This is because patriarchal 
Islamic groups generally seek to preserve traditional culture, beliefs and values, to revive the 
‘glorious past of the Muslims’ and to establish an Islamic state ruled over by Shariah law (TRAC 
Database, 2016). 
The mobilisation of females in patriarchal Islamic groups in violent extremist roles (including, but 
not limited to, suicide bombing) is therefore a relatively new phenomenon, and the fact that more 
and more women are being radicalised and involved in these organisations (Laster & Erez, 2015) 
introduces increased security threats for societies targeted by such violence. This evolution of the 
role of women is significant, considering the traditionally restrictive nature of such groups when it 
comes to females, and so it is important to examine the extent to which groups are using these 
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tactics, and the logic behind why some groups have mobilised women, while others have not. My 
research question therefore is this: Under what conditions are patriarchal Islamic groups more 
likely to mobilise women in violent acts of terror?  
In order to answer this question, I will first provide evidence that a ready supply of women exists, 
proving that it is the demand side of the equation that has changed over time. I will then briefly 
touch on how and, more importantly, why group ideology has evolved in relation to female 
participation. Chapter 2 will contain a benefit-cost analysis of mobilising women in these roles, 
while Chapter 3 will explore the current theories that exist. My theory of gambling for survival will 
be explained in Chapter 4 after which the design and methodology section will be set out in Chapter 
5. Chapters 6 and 7 will focus on the case studies and analysis respectively, followed by the 
concluding remarks in Chapter 8. 
1.1 Supply 
The aim of this paper is to examine when demand for women in these roles arises, assuming that 
the supply is already there. This is because the organisations themselves tend to act as gatekeepers 
to their participation, as women in patriarchal societies cannot contribute if the organisations do 
not permit them to do so. As Cunningham (2015) observes, women’s roles in these groups are 
currently ‘limited largely by organizational opposition rather than women’s willingness to be 
violent’.  
The theory of a readily available supply of women willing to mobilise in violent acts for extremist 
groups is supported in numerous ways. For example, studies show that socially suppressed women 
are more likely to want to mobilise in terrorist activities in an effort to challenge the societal norms 
and combat gender inequality (Neuberger & Valentini, 1996; Dalton & Asal, 2011). The fact that 
there has been a huge increase in the number of women mobilising in violent activities since the 
emergence of fatwas and other messages from religious leaders permitting such actions (SITE 
Intelligence Group, 2010; Middle East Quarterly, 2004) demonstrates that group leaders act as 
gatekeepers for their participation (Weinberg & Eubank, 2011). Furthermore, it is not only evident 
that women are critical for maintaining and promoting online terrorist networks (Bohannon, 2016), 
but these online networks, forums and publications show that they are also eager to mobilise on the 
front lines of action and have actually pushed for the opportunity to partake in these roles (Bloom, 
2007a; SITE Intelligence Group, 2010).  
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While this paper focuses on the demand side of the equation, this is not to say that women have no 
agency in the matter – this, of course, is another interacting element. The motivations of women to 
participate in violent roles has been extensively discussed however (Yesevi, 2014), and the 
numerous and varied findings would be far too broad to address within this paper. This would be 
an interesting and important avenue for future research however. 
1.2 Group Ideology 
It would seem that there has been, to some extent, an ideological shift in that many groups now 
claim that the obligation for Jihad is equal for both men and women (Bloom, 2014), however it 
seems likely that this change occurred in order to benefit the group in some specific way, as 
opposed to a naturally occurring shift in beliefs where groups begin to include the liberation of 
women in their goals. Numerous scholars flatly reject the latter in fundamentalist societies (Burko 
& Erez, 2006; Ness, 2005; Peteet, 1986) considering that despite escalating participation, women 
are still marginalised within those organisations, usually being relegated to traditional supportive 
duties, or tactical suicide bombing, and precluded from positions of authority; and women’s issues 
have not entered the ideology of the groups. Furthermore, Burko and Erez (2006: 2) show that 
while they may be permitted to actively participate in the public sphere, they are confined to 
‘nationalist roles’ and must still abide by ‘cultural and religious codes which bind women firmly to 
traditional roles’ which are strictly preserved by the movement. In this way, women seem to have 
been used in these circumstances as a tool to further political goals, as ‘inexpensive cannon fodder’ 
(Bloom, 2007b: 5), in a way that does not liberate them from societal constraints, but rather requires 
them to surrender to patriarchal hegemony. 
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Chapter 2: Benefit-Cost Analysis 
When considering the mobilisation of women in tactical operations, organisations must conduct a 
benefit-cost analysis in order to determine whether the benefits outweigh the costs in the specific 
circumstances. In this way, groups must consider the extent to which women's participation can 
promote the groups’ objectives, and what the likely consequences of this might be. As Dalton & 
Asal (2011) point out, this corresponds with Webber’s theory of social closure, which would imply 
that group inclusion or exclusion of traditionally socially subjugated females as activists relies on 
the potential benefits they could bring with regard to “an improvement in degree, in kind, in the 
security or the value of the satisfaction” (Webber, 1978: 43). I will begin by running through a 
number of the widely acknowledged benefits before moving on to the costs that such mobilisation 
may bring to different groups. 
2.1 Benefits 
The effectiveness of women as perpetrators of violence has been demonstrated in previous research 
(O’Rourke, 2009) and there exists a huge body of literature outlining the various ways in which 
groups benefit from their mobilisation in such roles. Not only does this tactic double the 
possibilities for recruitment, but some authors have claimed that women are more dedicated to the 
cause than their male counterparts, due to the personal rather than ideological motives that are 
assumed to drive them (O’Connor, 2007). 
A study by Lindsey O’Rourke (2009) observed that women are more effective at targeting specific 
individuals in attacks and at increasing the death toll. Looking solely at suicide bombings for a 
moment, according to the Chicago Project on Security & Terrorism Suicide Attack Database, the 
first recorded female perpetrators were in 1985 with only 27 deaths from 5 attacks. While the 
numbers have fluctuated since then, this low figure is undeniably in stark contrast to the 35 attacks 
and 275 deaths recorded in 2008, and the 32 attacks and 444 deaths in 2015. Furthermore, according 
to a 2011 report from the US Army TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity: 
 "Although women make up roughly 15% of the suicide bombers within groups which utilize 
females, they were responsible for 65% of assassinations; 20% of women who committed a suicide 
attack did so with the purpose of assassinating a specific individual, compared with 4% of male 
attackers." 
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Their effectiveness, O’Rourke (2009) notes, is due to cultural norms governing women’s behaviour 
in those societies, whereby persistent gender stereotypes portray women as being ‘innocent, 
defenseless, fragile and non-violent’ figures and as bearers and nurturers of life, as opposed to 
destroyers of it (Yesevi, 2014; Seib & Janbek, 2011: 87), so their involvement with such acts seems 
irreconcilable. As Bloom (2005: 57) has theorised: ‘The use of the least-likely suspect is the most-
likely tactical adaption for a terrorist group under scrutiny’. The horror incited by female 
perpetrators amplifies domestic and international media attention, and plays into the hands of 
organisations, which relish in the media spotlight.  
Furthermore, women can go unsuspected and undetected because of these common perceptions, 
gender-biased enforcement and a lack of female security personnel, allowing them to access targets 
that would be inaccessible to men and, consequently, to cause greater destruction (Ness, 2005). The 
fact that they are able to hide contraband under their abayas or conceal large explosives by feigning 
pregnancy, without fear of being searched due to cultural sensitivities, is a huge tactical and 
strategic advantage, especially in situations where evasion of strict counter-terrorism measures is 
necessary (Bloom, 2005). It results in a lose-lose situation for opposing forces who risk an increase 
in attacks if they do not search women, but risk causing public outcry if they do search women due 
to the perceived violation of cultural and religious norms, which may result in an escalation in 
recruitment of the male population who feel a renewed need to protect the honour of women, as 
was the case in the 1960s-70s with the provisional IRA (Bloom, 2014; Seib & Janbek, 2011: 77). 
Many have further surmised that women have been mobilised as a propaganda tool that shames 
men into militant action to reassert their manhood in such patriarchal societies (Yesevi, 2014; 
Bloom, 2005; Berko & Erez 2006). Their martyrdom may also summon feelings of sympathy, 
desperation and the desire for revenge, further stimulating recruitment. 
The study by O’Rourke (2009) claims that such tactical advantages are encouraging more 
religiously motivated groups to follow the lead of the secular organisations in their recruitment of 
women for suicide terrorism. Moreover, it seems that this applies not only to suicide bombing, but 
also to wider incidents of violent extremism - February 2016 saw two female members of a branch 
of Al-Qaeda involved in a four person armed attack in a restaurant and hotel in the capital of 
Burkina Faso, killing 30 civilians. 
s1785117 
10 
2.2 Costs 
Despite the diverse range of tactical and strategic benefits that the mobilisation of women brings 
to organisations, studies have shown that they still play a relatively infrequent role in this regard 
(Pedahzur, Perliger & Weinberget, 2003), suggesting that other factors must mitigate these 
advantages. It is therefore also essential to consider the costs that this tactic may inflict on the 
groups being studied.  
Some scholars believe that female participation in violent acts and the symbolic value affixed to 
maternal sacrifice signals the importance and depth of the issues at stake, which serves to 
demonstrate the pervasiveness and strength of an organisation and can be exploited to construct 
identities of patriotism, nationalism and loyalty to the group (Berko & Erez, 2006; Seib & Janbek, 
2011; Zedalis, 2004). This is but one viewpoint however, as it could equally be seen as an indicator 
of weakness by supporters and enemies alike: that they have been forced to resort to mobilising 
female operatives out of desperation. This could have severe consequences on the reputation and 
legitimacy of the group itself, resulting in further diminishing support from the host population. 
Opposition forces could utilise this tactical change in order to demonise the group and weaken its 
moral standing in society. This of course, could also occur independently: their actions could be 
rejected by the host community as immoral and a flouting of cultural and religious conventions, 
possibly resulting in the group loosing support, which is naturally contrary to their goals. 
Dr. Hani al-Sibai, a London-based Jihadi scholar, stated in 2008 that the mobilisation of women in 
violent acts was due to weak controls on Shariah law, and that the suggestion that al-Qaeda or ISIS 
were using such tactics was merely an attempt to portray the organisations as weak and as having 
failed in their recruitment of men (SITE Intelligence Group, 2010). This shows that even strong 
supporters of the cause initially did not approve of these tactics, however just two months later he 
backtracked considerably stating: ‘When Muslim land is occupied by non-believers, jihad is 
mandatory for all Muslims, male and female’ (Bakier, 2008). It therefore seems that such scholarly 
authorities approved by these Islamic groups feel the need to adapt their opinion in the face of such 
tactical innovations. It is important to note however that unlike secular groups, they continue to 
strictly enforce gender roles and have limited the proportion of female attackers to a low 
percentage, probably in an attempt to circumvent alienating the male members and supporters 
(O’Rourke, 2009: 697-98). 
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One other theory that has been advanced is that these patriarchal groups limit or preclude the 
mobilisation of women in political violence in order to prevent an increase in female autonomy, 
empowerment and influence, and to preclude the development of women rights in society and 
politics (Bloom, 2014). In this case, adopting tactics that mobilise women in this way could be seen 
as contrary to this goal of repression, and could be poorly received by supporters who do not 
endorse female agency in any such form. This could negatively affect the group by losing the 
support of these ultra-traditional members. 
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Chapter 3: Current Theories for Mobilisation 
It is clear that the ideological, cultural and religious orientation of organisations moderates the 
entrance of women into these groups, with fundamentalist groups usually confining them to 
traditional auxiliary positions due to social conservatism and a profoundly gender-biased 
organisational culture (Cook, 2005; Cunningham, 2003).  More recently however, their roles have 
been expanded, with Zedalis (2004), for example, identifying a shift of opinion within the Islamic 
clergy from opposition, to indifference to eventual endorsement of female suicide bombers. So 
what explanations have been presented to account for the considerable revision surrounding female 
participation?  
3.1 Age 
Dalton & Asal (2011) have suggested that the size and age of an organisation are significant 
predictors of the likelihood of the strategic mobilisation of women. They found that the older an 
organisation is, the more likely it is to mobilise women in violent attacks due to factors such as the 
need for tactical innovation, as outlined above, and the need to further legitimize a group’s cause. 
They contend that this could be explained by that fact that older organisations would have a firmly 
embedded and highly developed network which would reinforce its sustainability and that it would 
have had a significant amount of time to cultivate and spread its ideology and causes, attracting 
both male and female members of society to the network. Furthermore, long established 
organisations would suggest ‘reliability, accountability and capability in terms of the development 
of internal structure and personnel, resource obtention and performance through processes of 
organisational learning’ (Dalton & Asal, 2011: 808), granting older organisations the flexibility to 
change.  
3.2 Size/Strength 
Even more influential a predictor was the size of the organisation. The study found that larger 
organisations were more likely to mobilise women, as the larger availability of resources makes 
them ‘more resilient to change-related setbacks’ and so they are more likely to undertake such 
tactical innovations (Dalton & Asal, 2011: 807). Furthermore, Bloom (2014) notes that some 
organisations such as Al Qaeda may have inadvertently been drawn into using this innovation after 
undergoing significant structural change by incorporating regional affiliates into its forces. These 
subgroups (AQ Iraq, Chechen militants, Al Shabaab, etc.) quickly began to include women in 
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violent acts, while Al Qaeda central initially denied that their organisation mobilised women. They 
have since adopted the innovation themselves, demonstrating how their subsidiaries influenced 
their tactics in the long term. 
3.3 Increased counterterrorism measures 
It has been widely acknowledged that a principal reason to recruit women in these roles is the 
presence of new counterterrorism measures, which have made it much more difficult for men to 
carry out the missions themselves. This is evidenced by the fact that there was a significant time 
lapse between the use of men and the use of women in suicide attacks, and that women were only 
used in these campaigns after counterterrorism measures were implemented in target states 
(O’Rourke, 2009). This has compelled organisations to adopt the tactic of mobilising women in 
violent acts as a technical and strategic innovation due to the ‘instrumental and symbolic 
effectiveness of gender stereotypes in target societies’ as outlined above, which they have exploited 
in order to circumvent ever increasing security and to obtain strategic advantage (Laster & Erez, 
2015).  
Furthermore, it has caused changes in targeting, from ‘hard’ military targets to ‘soft’ civilian ones, 
which could be another reason to mobilise women who can blend in more easily (Bloom, 2014). 
This would explain why women were mobilised much earlier in al-Qaeda Iraq, but at the same time 
were eschewed by al-Qaeda central - the defensive security situation in Iraq was much tighter, 
requiring this change in tactics in order to effectively continue with attacks. Conversely, this would 
explain why women have not been mobilised to such an extent (or even at all) in Islamic societies 
where a vulnerable state of security exists. The unique context (as in Iraq) serves to challenge 
repressive attitudes about the potential of women and the roles they are permitted to play (SITE 
Intelligence Group, 2010) and increasingly seems to lead to ideological retreat as their role is 
reimagined and expanded to suit the needs of the group. As Cunningham (2015) has remarked: 
‘Terrorists want to be successful, and women have operational advantages’ and for this reason 
even the most patriarchal groups are willing to sacrifice certain principles in order to gain tactical 
and operational success. O’Rourke (2009: 684) made a similar observation in her study on female 
suicide terrorism, stating that they ‘enlist women as suicide attackers because their organisational 
aim is strategic success’. Cunningham has observed elsewhere however that Iraqi militancy was 
predominantly nationalist as opposed to religious, unlike the situation in Afghanistan which strictly 
abides by a global Jihadi ideology which has not gained such widespread national support, and for 
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this reason mobilisation of women in Iraq was possible and legitimised much more easily and 
earlier than in Afghanistan (Cunningham, 2012). 
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Chapter 4: Hypothesis - Gambling for Survival 
A further explanation for such ideological retreat is that the group is in duress and is therefore 
implementing a sort of ‘gambling for survival’ mechanism, as described by Chiozza & Goemans 
(2011) in relation to diversionary warfare. In that context they concluded that leaders in countries 
which lack institutional protection for those that have been forcibly removed from office are more 
likely to initiate international conflict when there is a significant risk of their forcible removal, 
which would otherwise likely result in death, imprisonment or exile for them. The initiation of 
conflict, Chiozza & Goemans (2011; 195) argue, is therefore a gamble for survival under fear of 
‘the threat or use of force’ after forcible removal, which depends on victory to increase the leaders 
legitimacy or resources. This is because they have little to lose but much to gain. Applying this to 
the mobilisation of women, we could say that organisations which are in duress may gamble with 
the mobilisation of women under fear of group extinction. 
This fear may stem partly from a shortage of men to uphold the cause. Scholars have suggested 
that this could be a significant factor that leads to such radical departures from the traditionally 
conservative roles of women (Seib & Janbek, 2011). This implies one of two causal factors: that 
men are dying in action or are being captured by the enemy, possibly due to the increased security 
measures mentioned above; or alternatively, that recruitment, and therefore support, has declined. 
Either of these scenarios would logically result in the organisation seriously considering the kind 
of tactical change that the mobilisation of women would constitute. The first scenario played out 
in Russia at the beginning of the 20th Century when the roles of women in revolutionary groups 
increased due to the reduced number of male activists after the war against Japan (Porter, 1987: 15-
17). While not an Islamic uprising, this shows that groups are willing to abandon gender 
stereotyping in times of crisis in an attempt to maintain their position.  
Cook (2005) however has asserted that women may simply be mobilised as a tactical element of 
surprise, as opposed to a requirement due to a lack of men. The need for a larger pool of recruits 
could also indicate an intention to expand the organisation, in both size and scope (Dickey, 2005). 
By drastically changing tactics like this however, a group risks ostracising their core supporters 
through ideological retreat unless there was some other good reason to do so, such as the need for 
technological innovation due to tightly enforced counterterrorism measures or diminishing support. 
One other explanation that seems to support the theory that the group may be suffering from a 
dwindling of male recruits is that women are mobilised in order to shame men into becoming 
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activists, as outlined above. This is supported by comments from prominent figures such as Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of AQI, who appealed: 
  "Are there no men, so that we have to recruit women? Isn’t it a shame for the sons of my 
own nation that our sisters ask to conduct martyrdom operations while men are preoccupied with 
life?” (Dickey, 2005: 27) 
Each of these factors explains why the group may be ‘gambling for survival’. Cunningham (2015) 
has also admitted that when groups in conservative societies feel threatened or when they believe 
themselves to be in a state of ‘total war’, they may be willing to bypass societal norms enough to 
allow for the temporary mobilisation of women in various political and public roles that they would 
normally be precluded from.  
O’Rourke (2009: 692) concludes that ‘strategy trumps ideology’, and while I agree with this 
analysis, there is a need to delve into the necessity for this strategic change. She has also claimed 
that apart from effectiveness, it is primarily competition with secular groups in the same region that 
has led to the change in tactics by religious groups; but this cannot explain similar actions in 
situations where no rival groups exist. The theory of decline and subsequent gambling for survival 
mechanism however seems like a highly plausible explanation and it has not yet been extensively 
analysed as a leading explanation into the mobilisation of women. 
Essentially, my theory of decline and gambling for survival sets out that the mobilisation of women 
becomes a more likely strategy among patriarchal Islamic groups which are struggling to maintain 
their very existence due to factors such as declining support, losses in battle, the capture of forces 
due to increasingly rigorous counterterrorism strategies, and so on. Such pressure on these groups 
is likely to force their leaders to consider compromises such as the tactical mobilisation of women 
in violent acts of terror. While normally these groups would be vehemently opposed to such tactics 
due to ideological and cultural reasons, together with the reasons set out in the costs section,  other 
innovative options may be entirely exhausted, leading them to the conclusion that without such 
immediate and drastic action, the group may become defunct altogether. In an effort to revive the 
group and bring it back from the brink of extinction, leaders are therefore likely to be more willing 
to exhaust all possible options, including the mobilisation of women, as a last resort. 
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Chapter 5: Design and Methodology 
In order to answer my question I will conduct multi-method research comprising qualitative 
comparative analysis of a selection of cases, together with process tracing, in order to reach valid 
inferences. The earlier benefit-cost section can help determine when the benefits might outweigh 
the costs in each case, together with identifying situations in which these tactics have proven either 
effective or detrimental to specific groups. I will need to examine those groups to determine why 
the group changed tactics to begin with - were they gambling for survival as I predict, or is it one 
of the explanations laid out in Chapter 3 that caused the change. 
The importance of not selecting on the dependent variable was highlighted by King, Keohane and 
Verba (1994), who rightly argued that doing so merely leads to researchers selecting cases which 
they know will confirm their theories, but that do not accurately represent the population (selection 
bias). This was evident in Pape’s (2003) work, which was criticized by Ashworth et al. (2008) for 
sampling on the dependent variable (suicide terror), resulting in the conclusion that he could not 
draw accurate inferences from his research. He failed to examine cases in which suicide terror was 
not used in circumstances in which the independent variable was the same (where occupation was 
present). In order to avoid this pitfall, I will examine groups that use violent resistance in general, 
not only the ones that mobilise women in these violent acts. I will also examine groups with similar 
independent variables, including being religiously motivated and patriarchal. By exploring 
instances where scope conditions/independent variables are similar but the dependent 
variable/outcome is different, I will hopefully also be able to theorize what caused the difference 
in behaviour between similar groups. 
There are a number of factors that I have considered in my case selection, including whether groups 
are religious or secular, whether they are patriarchal or liberal in their views and treatment of 
women, the strength and age of the organisation, what allegiances or associations they have with 
other groups and their level of activity in violent acts. Furthermore, I did not want to base my case 
selection on the political motivations of groups due to the well known adage ‘one [wo]man’s 
terrorist is another [wo]man’s freedom fighter’. I focused instead on any Islamic groups which use 
violence in furtherance of their goals, but which have shown resistance to mobilising women due 
to patriarchal views within those societies. This has allowed me to consider both jihadi and non-
jihadi groups. After initially researching a large selection of organisations, I finally selected the 
following three cases: Al-Shabaab, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hezbollah. 
s1785117 
18 
I have chosen these groups for a number of reasons. Firstly, all groups are religious, however to 
varying extents. Two of the three groups are extremist jihadi groups, however Hezbollah, a Shi’ite 
group for example, has made efforts in recent years to become more secular in an attempt to 
position itself as a legitimate political entity, while the IMU had a greater focus on militancy and 
nationalism to begin with, but has gradually become radicalised and increasingly influenced by the 
extremist organisations it has pledged its loyalty to at any one time. Secondly, all groups are 
patriarchal groups. This characteristic is common for such extremist groups which tend to repress 
women and confine them to traditional supportive roles. This is of particular significance to the 
question I am seeking to answer, as some have broken with this patriarchal stance in their 
mobilisation of women in frontline roles. Third, all groups have carried out numerous attacks, 
which will hopefully add more depth to the analysis. I have not chosen groups with few attacks as 
this may distort my findings, as it is generally more common for men to carry out such operations. 
Finally, not all groups have actually mobilised women in acts of violence - two of the three groups 
have mobilised women, while one has not. I hope to explain this variation during my analysis. 
In order to analyse the motivations for patriarchal Islamic groups to change tactics in mobilising 
women in these roles, I will try to determine which of the four main theories laid out above provides 
the best explanation. To do this I will consider the following variables which are embedded in those 
theories: age of group, strength/size of group, whether there was a prior increase in counterterrorism 
measures, and whether the group is in duress (by observing the groups activity levels and 
image/popularity in order to determine whether the group is enjoying success or whether it has 
cause to be worried for its own survival). It is important to note here that increased counterterrorism 
measures could also be a partial cause for group duress, as fighters are lost to intensified security 
precautions. I contend however that other issues effecting the group are also at play in order for 
them to make the decision to mobilise women. 
An analysis of these variables will help to support or undermine the most convincing of the theories 
set out in the above section. Therefore, if the age and/or size of the group proves to be a sufficient 
indicator of the mobilisation of women, then this would serve to prove Dalton & Asal (2011) correct 
in their theorizing. If on the other hand there was a prior increase in counterterrorism measures, in 
accordance with Laster & Erez (2015), in each case that women were mobilised, then this could be 
the primary reason for tactical innovation. Finally, if it can be shown that support for the group had 
been declining in each case that women were subsequently used, then this may prove the most 
convincing reason. 
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Chapter 6: Case Studies 
6.1 Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin (Aka: al-Shabaab) 
6.1.1 General outline 
Al-Shabaab was originally the militant wing of the former Somali Supreme Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which had assumed control of South Somalia in 2006 and was a rival administration to the 
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. It was forced to retreat by Somali and Ethiopian 
forces in a ‘2 week war’ between December 2006 and January 2007 (Global Security), however al-
Shabaab has maintained attacks since then as an extremist splinter group of the ICU. It pledged 
allegiance and became an official affiliate of Al Qaeda in 2012, and is active in East Africa and 
Yemen, although mainly operates in Somalia. Its stated goal is for Somalia to be a fundamentalist 
Islamic State with no foreign influence and, to this end, it has mobilised in guerrilla warfare and 
terrorist attacks against the Somali Government in an attempt to destabilise it, together with other 
foreign forces supporting the Government including the Ethiopian presence in Somalia, the African 
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeepers, non-governmental aid institutions and allies 
of the Somali Government (Global Security).  
In 2009 a suicide attack was carried out by a man disguised as a woman in order to pass more easily 
through security. This shows that the group clearly recognised the benefits of mobilising women 
in attacks at an early stage in its development. Despite this however, it took a further 3 years until 
2012 for the group to actually mobilise women in such positions, showing their initial hesitance to 
use such a tactic. In February 2012, a key member of al-Shabaab announced that parents should 
send their unmarried daughters to join in the Jihad and fight alongside the men for the Islamic cause 
(Khalif, 2012). The group has since initiated attacks in neighbouring countries, however these 
attacks have been in response to military support those countries gave to the Somali government. 
One issue with this group that sets it apart from the other organisations that are being analysed here 
is that it is a clan-based insurgent group, with members originating from a variety of different clans 
with diverse goals and shifting alliances (National Counterterrorism Centre). Therefore, while its 
leadership is supportive of the goal of global Jihad, many of its fighters are actually primarily 
concerned with the nationalistic fight against the Somali government. Nevertheless, it still 
demonstrated reluctance to mobilise women in violent acts, showing that it is still a patriarchal 
group. 
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6.1.2 Age 
Al-Shabaab is a relatively new group in comparison with many others. Having only become an 
independent entity in 2006, as essentially an extremist splinter group of the ICU, it is, as of 2016, 
a meagre 10 years old. It seems to have recognised the benefits of the use of women after 3 years 
of existence, and at the time of mobilisation of its first female operative it was only 7 years of age. 
Taking this timeframe into account, al-Shabaab’s age does not therefore seem to have been a 
significant factor in the decision to mobilise women in violent roles, as if it had it would likely have 
deterred them from such action, in accordance with the theory set out by Dalton & Asal (2011).  
6.1.3 Size/Strength 
Al-Shabaab is believed to be several thousand members strong, making it a relatively large 
organisation in this context. Saying this however, they were reported to have lost a significant 
number of troops from 2010-2011 in their attempts to hold the city of Mogadishu and in defense 
of much of the area they had previously controlled from the combined African Union and Somali 
forces. In 2013 however, the estimated size of the organisation was still between 3,000 and 7,000 
(Global Security). The significant size of the group may therefore account for its ability to use such 
a risky tactic as the mobilisation of women in such roles. 
6.1.4 Increased Counterterrorism measures 
Counterterrorism measures increased within Somalia from 2011 when combined forces from 
AMISOM and the Somali National Army led an offensive attack regaining control of previously 
al-Shabaab held areas and sending them into retreat. This could have led to the need for tactical 
innovation in the form of the instrumental use of women in attacks. 
6.1.5 Group Duress? 
Al-Shabaab was suffering from a decline in support and recruitment from as far back as 2009, after 
Ethiopian forces pulled out of Somalia. It has been suggested that the historical Somali hatred of 
Ethiopia was a driving force for recruitment and support of al-Shabaab, and that their departure 
eliminated the incentive of many to join the cause (Daniels, 2012: 66). 2011 brought even greater 
loss as Al-Shabaab’s control was largely degraded when a concerted military effort was 
implemented by forces from AMISOM and Somalia (Global Security). This mounting pressure, 
together with a significant loss of personnel due to their efforts to retain control over Mogadishu 
s1785117 
21 
since 2010, has led to them loosing large areas of the country, particularly important urban centers 
that they had once controlled. 
It has been reported that constant infighting among senior leaders of the organisation has 
aggravated disagreements and fractures within the group, such as how they should go about 
revitalising it (National Counterterrorism Centre), threatening the legitimacy and durability of the 
group as an entity. Furthermore, the leadership of al-Shabaab is said to be extremely paranoid about 
the possible presence of spies who could transmit sensitive information about the groups locations 
and plans to the US, enabling drone strikes to be conducted against them (Global Security). This 
has severely limited the group’s ability, and indeed their motivation, to socialise with the general 
population and rebuild its recruitment network and capabilities (Global Security). 
These issues, together with the increase in counterterrorism measures, link up with the first use of 
women by the group, in that the organisation began to suffer blows firstly in 2009, and again more 
drastically in 2011, and subsequently began to mobilise women and promote such tactics in 2012. 
6.2 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 
6.2.1 General outline 
The IMU was formed by Juma Namangani and Tahir Yuldashev, with the help of the Taliban and 
al-Qaeda, in 1998 as a militant Wahhabi Islamic group whose stated goal was to overthrow the 
secular Uzbek Government and establish an Islamic caliphate with the application of Sharia law 
(Sanderson, Kimmage & Gordon, 2010). In August 1999, the IMU officially declared jihad against 
the governments of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and in the same year began conducting guerrilla 
attacks, bombings and kidnappings. Tight security meant that the group was forced to operate 
outside of Uzbekistan however, primarily in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The IMU guerrillas 
sporadically attacked Uzbek and Kyrgyz territory, mobilising in fighting, kidnapping and the 
smuggling of narcotics and weaponry, but were repelled each time by government forces, retreating 
to Afghanistan where they had the protection of the Taliban, together with their base of operations 
(Fredholm, 2006).  
The IMU suffered severe losses fighting alongside the Taliban and al-Qaeda against the 2001 US-
led Afghan invasion, including the death of their most influential leader, Namangani (Fredholm, 
2006). It is estimated that they lost about half of their combatants in that conflict (Cronin et al, 
2004: 38). This set it on ‘a trajectory of fragmentation and reconstitution’ as it was expelled from 
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its Afghan base and it effectively split into three different groups, with only one group remaining 
loyal to the cause and to Yuldashev, which relocated to Pakistan in 2002 (Sanderson, Kimmage & 
Gordon, 2010: 7).  
The IMU’s activity from 2002-2007 is somewhat unclear due to a scarcity of reliable sources and 
a wide variety of interpretations, but it seems clear that it was in a chaotic state of affairs 
(Sanderson, Kimmage & Gordon, 2010). Saying this however, we do know that they turned to 
suicide bombing as a tactic for a brief period in 2004 and that a number of those attacks involved 
female suicide bombers. After this spate of attacks however, they neither used the tactic of suicide 
bombing, nor the mobilisation of women in similar violent roles again, and even repudiated the 
attacks. Bloom (2005) attributes this to the public outrage that these tactics elicited; forcing the 
IMU to abandon such strategies in order salvage support. In this case, the target population 
outrightly rejected this strategy and, although the mobilisation of women is blurred by the 
simultaneous use of suicide bombing, we can see how such tactics can truly isolate a group from 
the population they are seeking to gain support from. 
6.2.2 Age 
The IMU was in existence for a mere 6 years before it mobilised women as suicide bombers. This 
is therefore a relatively young group and so it would seem that age was not a factor in this situation, 
as if it was it would likely have deterred the leadership from mobilising women. 
6.2.3 Size/Strength 
In comparison to other similar groups, the IMU was relatively small at the time of the female 
suicide bombings, with an estimated force of under 500 (US Department of State Report, 2004). 
This would seem to contradict the supposition that stronger groups are more likely to mobilise 
women. 
6.2.4 Increased Counterterrorism measures 
Counterterrorism measures were high in this case from the outset, with the IMU being forced to 
operate outside of Uzbekistan’s borders from its inception, and indeed even since the banning of 
its predecessor Adolat in 1992. Furthermore, most attacks launched by the IMU were repelled by 
the target country, resulting in the IMU withdrawing forces and retreating in many instances. This 
shows a steady level of counterterrorism measures from the beginning, with no evidence of any 
escalation of such measures.  
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6.2.5 Group Duress? 
The IMU suffered devastating losses in its support of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in 2001-2002, 
including the loss of its military leader, Juma Namangani, seriously disrupting its operations. In the 
aftermath of the Afghan war, the IMU’s severely weakened position led to significant splintering 
within the group, as outlined above, with only a fraction remaining loyal to the cause. US 
Department of State Reports even reveal a decline in numbers in the year leading up to the attacks, 
with an estimation of fewer than 700 in 2003, dropping to fewer than 500 in 2004 (US Department 
of State Report, 2003 & 2004).  
The sudden implementation of suicide bombings, together with the mobilisation of women, in 2004 
would therefore seem to be a panicked attempt to regain sympathy and support among the public. 
These tactics clearly backfired in this case however, as the population flatly rejected such strategies 
and demonstrated their outright disgust at such actions, leading the IMU to abandon similar tactics 
in the future. 
6.3 Hezbollah 
6.3.1 General outline 
Hezbollah’s formation dates back to 1982 during the 15 year Lebanese civil war (1975-1990) as a 
by-product of Israel's invasion and occupation of Lebanon, in which Israel had intended to oust 
hostile Palestinian militants who had been operating out of Southern Lebanon (Masters & Laub, 
2014). Rather than achieving this goal however, the occupation actually served to unite a dissident 
Shi’ite population in the uptake of arms in opposition to Israeli presence in South Lebanon. 
Hezbollah’s original goal therefore was nationalistic in that it sought to expel Israel and any other 
‘colonialist entity’ from Lebanese territory, and to allow for Lebanese citizens to choose what form 
of government should rule the country, however it’s manifesto also emphasised the desired goal of 
the destruction of Israel and advocated for an Islamic regime (Hezbollah Manifesto, 1985). The 
fact that it was financially, militarily and politically supported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, 
and politically by Syria, since its inception also enshrined a strong ideology of Islamic revolution 
in the group, but despite this, it avoided confrontation with the Christian community, which allowed 
it to gain more sympathy among the general Lebanese population. The Taif peace agreement of 
1991 led to the disarmament of all groups in Lebanon, with the exception of Hezbollah which was 
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viewed as necessary as the only competent force to expel Israeli forces from the ‘buffer zone’ in 
South Lebanon. 
Hezbollah began participating in the Lebanese Government in 1992 and, in this way, has become 
legitimised within the country itself. It has long been referred to as ‘a state within a state’ due to its 
provision of social and charitable services, its political organisation, and its sheer size and extensive 
military capabilities, which overshadow even those of the Lebanese Army (Masters & Laub, 2014). 
The withdrawal of Israeli forces in 2000 and the subsequent collapse of the Israeli backed South 
Lebanese Army was a huge victory for Hezbollah as it gave the impression of a fleeing, defeated 
Israel, placing the group on a pedestal in the Arab world. The removal of Israel however partly 
reduced its purpose, as it no longer had an opponent to fight. Sunni and Christian groups began to 
turn against Hezbollah in 2005 after a number of Hezbollah-orchestrated assassinations, however 
the group and its leaders regained popular support and their position as ‘heroes in the Arab world’ 
in 2006 (Ghitis, 2016) when it forced yet another Israeli invasion to withdraw and even evacuate 
parts of northern Israel, despite the fact that Hezbollah had incited Israeli action in the first place. 
This substantially boosted its military strength from 2006. 
While Hezbollah is classified as a terrorist group by entities such as the Arab League, the US and 
other Western countries, the EU, the UK and New Zealand designated only its military wing as 
such, while Russia recognises it as a ‘legitimate socio-political force’ (Ghitis, 2016; Kiselyova, 
2015). Its reputation and legitimacy in the Arab world as a national resistance movement has 
recently been compromised however, due to its controversial involvement in the sectarian Syrian 
Civil War since 2012, in which they are effectively fighting fellow Arabs at the behest of Iran, as 
opposed to its raison d’être of Israeli opposition (Samaha, 2016; Ghitis, 2016). They are admittedly 
the only Lebanese force strong enough to defend against ISIL, however they are now despised by 
Sunni’s and others for supporting such a tyrannical and murderous regime that suppresses its own 
citizens. 
While women have long been mobilised in supportive positions in the group, Hezbollah has never 
mobilised women in violent operations or in combat. Emphasis is instead placed on the importance 
of women in child rearing and in supporting their husbands in the cause and, while women are now 
encouraged to be well educated, they are not to be seen in high public political positions (Lynch, 
2010). A true nationalist group would likely have incorporated women into its operations; however, 
the fact that Hezbollah has not yet done this suggests strong cultural and religious ties, despite 
efforts to become a more secular organisation. 
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6.3.2 Age 
Hezbollah emerged in 1982, making it much older than many other groups still in existence today. 
Despite this, they have never turned to the use of women in violent acts. This may be down to their 
attempts to legitimise themselves as a political entity. Nevertheless, it would seem to suggest that 
in this case, the age of the group has not had any impact on its decision to mobilise women in 
violent operations. 
6.3.3 Size/Strength 
Hezbollah commands a remarkably strong force considering its widespread designation as a 
terrorist group. It is one of the strongest non-state military forces in the world, and indeed is even 
stronger than most national armies (Blanford, 2014). It controls an estimated 45,000 fighters, more 
than that of the Lebanese Armed Forces, and making it one of the largest and most consolidated 
organisations being studied here. This is mainly because it is armed and funded by Iran. Despite 
their vast availability of manpower, their resilience to knock-backs caused by tactical has not 
tempted them to mobilise women. This would seem to discredit the theory set out by Dalton & Asal 
(2011) in which they predict that the larger a group is, the more likely it is to mobilise women in 
violent positions. 
6.3.4 Increased Counterterrorism measures 
Because Hezbollah is a legitimate, democratically elected political party within Lebanon, and acts 
as the country’s primary armed force, it does not face any counterterrorism measures within the 
country. 
6.3.5 Group Duress 
Hezbollah has supported the Assad regime in the Syrian conflict since at least 2012, although it 
only came out as a public supporter in 2013. It is estimated that more Hezbollah fighters have been 
lost in the 4 years of this conflict than in the entire time between 1982-2000, in which they were 
resisting Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon (Saab & Blanford, 2016), and among the 
mounting dead are a number of top operatives and strategists whose deaths will have serious and 
enduring repercussions for the organisation (Ghitis, 2016). Furthermore, the groups support has 
suffered considerably and Sunni Muslims now vilify it due to its backing of the Assad government, 
which many consider a murderous and tyrannical regime (Samaha, 2016). It’s ‘prestige in the Arab 
world has plummeted’ due to the fact that it has deviated from its purely anti-Israel stance towards 
more Sunni-Shiite revolved rivalry, leading it to be ostracised by its surrounding Sunni-ruled 
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nations and designated as a terrorist organisation by the Gulf Cooperation Council  and the Arab 
League (Ghitis, 2016). Hezbollah’s intervention in the Syrian conflict has not only lost them 
support and lives on the battlefield, but has also cost them dearly financially (Saab & Blanford, 
2016). The Muslim rivalry also shows that while the group is attempting to become more secular, 
it is inevitably rooted to religion. 
While the decision to support Assad has undoubtedly weakened their support base, their ideological 
position and their manpower and financial resources, it has been suggested that it was a necessary 
sacrifice to make in order to sustain the groups existence (Filkins, 2013). This is because Syria has 
facilitated the relationship between Iran and the Hezbollah organisation over the years, providing 
a means to transport money and arms over land and providing political support to the regime 
(Ghitis, 2016). Despite the negative consequences of the Syrian situation, it must be acknowledged 
that the group has also vastly expanded in the last 10 years since 2006 in terms of both weaponry 
and manpower, and has gained invaluable combat experience from its involvement in Syria (Saab 
& Blanford, 2016). Experts believe that the organisation has replenished the supplies it lost in the 
2006 war against Israel and has even exceeded its previous level of armaments (Ghitis, 2016). 
Furthermore, many believe that Hezbollah’s current deteriorating popularity within Lebanon may 
be a temporary situation if the Syrian war ends soon with survival of the Assad regime, allowing 
the group to refocus their efforts on challenging Israel and once again boost its popular support 
(Ghitis, 2016; Saab & Blanford, 2016). 
In this case, the loss of support has not yet been sufficient to cause Hezbollah to mobilise women 
in violent positions. A number of explanations may be pinpointed to explain this outcome however. 
Hezbollah is in a unique position as one of the strongest non-state military forces in the world, and 
has legitimacy within Lebanon itself as a major government party. Its forces steadily increased 
from 2006 until 2012 when its support began to decline due to its support of Assad, however despite 
this it is still relied upon within Lebanon as the major force to protect the country from ISIL. 
Furthermore, its leaders may view the current diminished support levels as a temporary issue that 
will resolve itself once the war is over and Hezbollah is able to pivot back to its central aim of 
challenging Israel. 
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Chapter 7: Analysis 
 
 
7.2 Age 
Based on the groups selected for this paper, it would seem that age has had little to no influence on 
the group’s likelihood to mobilise women in violent acts of terror. In the case of al-Shabaab and 
the IMU, both organisations were relatively new when they began to use this tactic, while the much 
older and more socially embedded Hezbollah has never mobilised women in combat positions. This 
finding contradicts the first part of the theory set out by Dalton & Asal (2011) in which they suggest 
that older groups are more likely to use such risky tactics. 
7.3 Size/Strength 
The second part of Dalton & Asal’s (2011) theory maintains that the size or strength of a group is 
even more influential an indicator of whether they will strategically mobilise women in violent acts 
of terror. They found that larger organisations were more likely to place women in combat 
positions, as their abundant resources made them more adaptable and able to deal with setbacks 
related to tactical change, such as rejection by the host community of the new tactic.  
In the cases selected for observation here, there are a number of variations both in the size of the 
group and in the outcome. The IMU is by far the smallest of the three groups, with an estimated 
force of 500 fighters around the time of the use of female suicide bombers in 2004. This is in stark 
contrast to the estimated 45,000 fighters that Hezbollah purportedly controls, yet this group has 
never utilised such tactics in its activities. Finally, al-Shabaab controlled a relatively large force of 
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between 3,000 and 7,000 fighters in 2013, just after their first use of women in 2012. All three 
groups vary considerably in size, with the largest group rejecting the tactic, and the smallest one 
implementing it for the first time alongside suicide bombing. While in those two cases, the strength 
of the group does not seem to have been an indicator of the initial mobilisation of women in line 
with the findings of Dalton & Asal (2011), in the case of the IMU it could very well have been a 
reason that they immediately discontinued. In that case, the small size and young age of the group 
may have contributed to the propensity of the population to flatly reject such tactics, although the 
combined use of suicide bombing definitely played a large part in their outrage. Had the IMU been 
stronger or more deeply embedded in the target community, the tactic may not have been rejected 
so adamantly. To conclude, while the strength of al-Shabaab may have been an influencing factor 
in its decision to mobilise women in political violence, it does not seem to have been a significant 
indicator for either the IMU or Hezbollah. 
7.4 Counterterrorism Measures 
Increased counterterrorism measures in Somalia in 2011 may have been a factor in al-Shabaab’s 
decision to strategically mobilise women in violent roles. In the case of the IMU and Hezbollah 
however there does not seem to have been any change in such measures, in that Hezbollah does not 
face counterterrorism measures within Lebanon as it is largely viewed as a legitimate force there, 
while the IMU faced high levels of counterterrorism measures from its inception in 1998, right up 
until it mobilised women in 2004. It is important to note here that increased counterterrorism 
measures could also be a partial cause for group duress, as fighters are lost to intensified security 
precautions. I contend however that other issues effecting groups are at play in order for them to 
make the decision to mobilise women. 
7.5 Group Duress 
As demonstrated above, al-Shabaab and the IMU were both under severe duress leading up to their 
mobilisation of women in acts of violence. Al-Shabaab was suffering from declines in support and 
recruitment, significant death rates, including the death of senior leaders, and the loss of 
strongholds and important urban centers due to mounting attacks from AMISOM and Somali 
forces, together with fragmentation and distrust within the group, which weakened its legitimacy. 
The IMU was suffering similarly in that it had lost a devastating number of fighters in its battle 
against Western forces alongside the Taliban and al-Qaeda between 2001 and 2002, including 
Namangani, its most influential leader, severely disrupting its operations. Its weakened state, 
together with the loss of its military leader and infighting led to splinters within the group, which 
further weakened the IMU. Both of these groups were in critically weakened positions in the lead-
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up to their mobilisation of women, suggesting that this tactic may have been a last ditched attempt 
to somehow revive the group by eliciting sympathy and support from their target populations. 
While the tactic was rejected in the case of the IMU, that rejection was likely more so down to the 
use of suicide bombing as a tactic, as opposed to the use of women specifically. Nevertheless, both 
groups used the tactical mobilisation of women at critically weak periods in their existence, leading 
me to propose that it was indeed a method of ‘gambling for survival’. 
Hezbollah has also suffered significant blows in recent years due to the heightened number of 
casualties, including top operatives and strategists, a decline in support, and a drastic reduction in 
resources and finance, all due to its involvement in the Syrian conflict and its allegiance to the 
Assad regime. Despite this however, the group has never turned towards the use of women in 
attacks as a tactical innovation, and this may be down to unique factors such as the fact that the 
group expanded exponentially between 2006 and 2012 in terms of manpower and arms, meaning 
that tactical innovation has not yet become a necessary option, together with the fact that they are 
one of the largest non-state militarised forces in the world. The current downward trend in 
popularity is also widely viewed as a temporary issue that can be reversed once the Syrian conflict 
ends. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
The increased mobilisation of women in violent acts of terror in recent years, together with modern-
day communication platforms that provide effective and far-reaching recruitment means for these 
groups, makes this an increasingly pressing issue to examine and reflect upon. This is not to say 
that violence perpetrated by women is any more terrible than that perpetrated by men, however it 
doubles the pool of potential perpetrators of violent attacks, alters the profiles of potential terrorists, 
making counterterrorism efforts more difficult, and brings a variety of other benefits to such groups, 
as outlined in section 2.1. As extremist Islamic groups come under more and more strain from local 
government and international forces, they may therefore be increasingly inclined to resort to the 
mobilisation of women as a tactical advantage.  
From the above analysis, it is clear that there are a variety of concerns that may influence an 
organization’s decision to mobilise women in violent acts of terror, however after a study of the 
cases selected above, the most influential indicator seems to be group duress. It seems that groups 
in crisis conditions, suffering from issues such as declining recruitment levels, fracturing support, 
splintered leadership and high casualty rates, are more likely to mobilise women as a tactical 
advantage in their effort to wage jihad against the enemy as a sort of ‘gambling for survival’ 
mechanism. This mechanism not only applies to a number of cases, as shown above, but the case 
selection also demonstrates that it is applicable across a broad geographic area (from East Africa 
to Lebanon, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan).  
The limitations of this paper also need to be highlighted however. A major one in this case is the 
limited scope permitted by such a paper, allowing a comprehensive study of just three cases. 
Examining more cases on such a level would simply not have been plausible, while limiting the 
richness of detail would have detracted from the in-depth analysis. Another limitation is that every 
organisation to be analysed has their own unique history and characteristics that will invariably 
effect the group’s behaviour. Not all such variables can realistically be considered however, and 
doing so would limit the applicability of the study’s findings. An interesting piece of further 
research would be to extend this study in order to see how the various theories laid out above apply 
to a larger case selection, over time and an even broader geographical area. In order to make the 
study more quantitative, a small-n study could be included in order to test whether this theory is 
applicable to a majority of cases. Futhermore, this paper contributes to the field by focusing on the 
demand of organisations. Naturally, however, the motivations of women in patriarchal societies are 
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likely to interact with the explanations provided here. Further research could therefore combine 
these elements to examine how exactly they interact, which was beyond the scope of this paper. 
Having said this, the results gathered here are significant for counterterrorism measures and for 
predicting when groups may mobilise women in violent positions in the future. Taking the above 
information into account, governments should become aware not only of the operational 
advantages of mobilising women, but also of the circumstances in which such groups are likely to 
begin implementing such tactics. In order to prevent such a trend, governments should invest more 
in women’s rights and education and on more widespread counterterrorism measures, targeting 
both men and women in order to eliminate the tactical advantage of placing women in these 
positions.  
It will be interesting to see whether increased women’s rights in these societies in the years to come 
forces the ideologies of the groups in question to evolve, or whether they will maintain their current 
conservatism in this regard.  In the latter case, the question posed in this paper will remain relevant 
however and further study may be necessary. For now however, it seems clear that the increased 
mobilisation of women in these roles is largely a result of groups gambling for their own survival 
and, armed with this knowledge, such groups should be monitored more closely and 
counterterrorism efforts should reflect this developing trend.  
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